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Chile is unusual in having long-term experience with nationwide
school vouchers. A key criticism of school voucher systems is that
they make it easier for private schools to attract better teachers to
the detriment of public schools. This paper uses longitudinal data
from Chile to estimate a discrete choice dynamic programming
ðDCDPÞ model of teacher and nonteacher labor supply decisions
and to explore how wage policies affect the composition of the
teacher labor force in public and private schools. In the model,
individuals first decide whether to get a teaching degree and then
choose annually from among five work/home sector alternatives.
Empirical results show that private voucher schools attract better
teachers than public schools. However, the existence of the private
voucher sector also draws higher-productivity individuals into the
teaching profession.
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I. Introduction
In 1981, Chile adopted an innovative nationwide school voucher system
for primary and secondary education that still operates today.1 The voucher
reform dramatically changed the educational landscape, greatly increasing
the demand for and the supply of private schools. Attendance at private
schoolsmore thandoubled,with private schools today accounting formore
than half of school enrollment. Although there has been much speculation
and debate about likely effects of school voucher programs ðe.g., Hoxby
2002, 2003a, 2003b; Neal 2002; Ferreyra 2007Þ, most of the evidence from
USdatacomesfromstudiesexaminingshort-termeffectsof relativelysmall-
scale privately funded voucher programs ðe.g., Rouse 1998; Krueger and
Zhu 2004; Yau 2004Þ. Chile is unique in having long-term experience with
a large-scale school voucher system.
School vouchers in Chile are publicly funded, with voucher funds fol-
lowing the child to private schools that agree to accept the voucher as pay-
ment of tuition. Both governmental and private schooling sectors coexist
with free entry into the private sector and some governmental monitoring
of all schools.2 There are three broad types of schools: municipal, private-
subsidized, and private-nonsubsidized fee-paying. Until 1993, private sub-
sidized schools and municipal schools were financed primarily through per
capita governmental vouchers, but in 1993 therewas a change in the rules to
allow public and private schools to impose a small tuition charge on top of the
voucher.3 Private nonsubsidized schools, which include both religious ðmainly
CatholicÞ and lay schools, are financed from private tuition.4 Parents are free
to choose among municipal and both types of private schools.5
1 The voucher reform was one of several privatization and decentralization ef-
forts introduced by Augusto Pinochet’s military government.
2 For example, all schools are required to have licensed teachers. Schools also do
not receive additional voucher payments for class sizes that exceed 45 students. See
Verhoogen and Urquiola ð2009Þ.
3 Municipal schools sometimes also receive some additional funding in the form
of governmental transfers when the voucher amounts are not sufficient to cover
the school’s operating expenses.
IZA. Kenneth I. Wolpin is Distinguished Research Professor and Lay Family Pro-
fessor, Rice University, and professor emeritus, at the University of Pennsylvania
and a PSC research associate. We are very thankful for support from the Spencer
Foundation. Contact the corresponding author, Petra Todd, at petra@athena.sas
.upenn.edu. Information concerning access to the data used in this article is avail-
able as supplementary material online.
4 Private subsidized schools can be for-profit or not-for-profit; private non-
subsidized schools are usually for-profit. About three-quarters of private voucher
schools are for-profit schools ðElacqua 2006Þ.
5 In all types of schools, students are required to take standardized tests, called the
SIMCE tests. Each year, one or twogrades are chosen for these tests among the fourth,
eighth, and tenth grades. The school’s average test results are published annually, and
parents can compare the student’s test score performance at locally available schools.
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Advocates of school voucher systems cite their value in fostering com-
petition in both public and private schools and improving school quality
ðRouse 1998; Hoxby 2003a, 2003bÞ. Critics caution that they deplete public
schools of revenue and of their best teachers ðLadd 2002Þ. Most studies of
Chile’s school voucher program ðe.g., Bravo, Contreras, and Sanhueza 1999;
McEwan 2001; McEwan and Carnoy 2001; Contreras 2002; Sapelli and Vial
2002; Tokman 2002; Vegas 2002; Hsieh and Urquiola 2003; Tincani 2014Þ
compare test scores of children in different kinds of public and private
schools. The evidence on whether public or private schools are relatively
more effective in producing higher math and reading scores is mixed.6
It is widely perceived that Chile’s 1980 voucher reform led to significant
changes in the allocation of teachers across different types of schools, in
part because it was accompanied by decentralization measures that trans-
ferred the control of public schools to municipal authorities.7 Many pub-
lic school teachers were laid off and had to reapply for their jobs, now in
the municipal sector, or find jobs in the private sector. In addition, teacher
union contracts were revoked, giving public schools greater flexibility in
hiring and firing teachers, and national curriculum standards were relaxed,
giving schools more leeway in setting their own curriculum.8 After the
restoration of the democractic government in 1990, the teacher’s associa-
tion was reinstated and teacher pay was increased, nearly doubling. Today
teachers inChile’s public school systemagain belong to a powerful national
teachers’ union. Private school teachers are usually members of a smaller,
school-level teachers’ association, although sometimes they can also be
members of the public teachers’ association.
One of the key concerns about school voucher systems is that they
put private schools in a better position to attract the best teachers to the
detriment of public schools. Many education researchers suggest that
public school salary schedules create inefficiencies in the teacher labor
market because salaries are often based on rigid formulae that depend on
experience and educational background and do not respond flexibly to
teacher shortages or to reward better teachers. For example, Hoxby ð2002Þ
shows that salary schedules in charter and private schools in the United
States exhibit less wage compression than in public schools and are more
strongly correlated with teachers’ backgrounds in math and science, two
6 Estimation is made difficult by multiple selection problems, namely, that types
of children attending each school are self-selected and because unobserved factors
that determine student performance are likely to be related to the choice of school.
7 Prior to these reforms, Chile had a long tradition of providing some public
support for private ðmainly CatholicÞ schools, but the introduction of the voucher
system greatly increased the level of support going to private schools.
8 See Carnoy ð1997Þ.
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fields in which there are commonly shortages, and with teachers’ SAT
scores. If private schools are better able to tailor compensation to teaching
ability, then, unless there are other compensating factors, onewould expect
better teachers to select into the private teaching sector where they receive
higher wages.
This paper uses data from Chile to study teacher and nonteacher labor
supply decisions in a dynamic context. We examine how teacher com-
pensation schedules in themunicipal and private teaching sectors affect the
decision to become a teacher, the choice of sector inwhich towork, and the
decision about whether to accept a nonteaching job or be out of the la-
bor force. We also investigate the empirical support for whether private
voucher schools attract higher-quality teachers than municipal schools on
average. In particular, we explore differences in the kinds of teachers who
choose to teach in the public and private sectors and the extent to which
differences in teacher compensation across public and private sectors
explain the selection patterns.
The dynamic decision making model we develop extends earlier models
of Stinebrickner ð2001a, 2001bÞ to allow for three teaching sectors ðpub-
lic, private voucher, and private nonvoucherÞ, a nonteaching sector, and a
home sector and to incorporate the initial choice about whether to become
a certified teacher, which is important to capture labor supply responses of
new college graduates.9 In the model, individuals first decide whether to
obtain teaching certification, and then individuals who are certified receive
wage offers and decide among fivework/home sector alternatives: ðiÞwork
in a municipal school, ðiiÞ work in a private subsidized ðvoucherÞ school,
ðiiiÞwork in a private nonsubsidized school, ðivÞwork in a nonteaching job,
or ðvÞ not work. Individuals who are not certified can only choose iv or v.
Labor market experience in teaching and nonteaching accumulates endog-
enously.
Because fertility is also potentially an important factor related to wom-
en’s working decisions, the model incorporates fertility as a stochastic pro-
cess that depends on state variables. The utility from choosing a particular
sector in each time period depends both on pecuniary factors ðwagesÞ and
nonpecuniary factors ðe.g., the number of children, perceived benefitsÞ. Our
model also allows for unobserved heterogeneity in wages and preferences,
using the Keane and Wolpin ð1997Þ multinomial types approach.10
Our analysis samples are drawn from two longitudinal surveys in Chile.
One is a survey called theEncuesta de Proteccio´n Social ðEPSÞ, which gath-
9 In Chile, teacher certification is required to work in any type of school.
10 The approach is similar to Heckman and Singer’s ð1984Þ use of discrete types
in duration analysis.
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ered information from a random sample ofworking-ageChileans.11We use
data collected in the 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009 waves. Most relevant for
our analysis is the information on demographics, work and lay-off history,
fertility, wages, and educational attainment. We use in the estimations in-
dividuals who graduated from college or obtained their teaching certifica-
tion after 1990. Of the 816 such individuals in the EPS sample, 12.1% re-
ceived a teaching certificate.Given the small sample size of “teachers” in the
EPS survey, we only use the longitudinal information for the 690 “non-
teachers” in estimating the model.
For longitudinal information on teachers, we use the ELD ðEncuesta
Longitudinal DocenteÞ, which was collected for the first time in 2005 and
then again in 2009 for the purpose of studying the wages and working
conditions of teachers and school administrators. The survey was admin-
istered to about 6,000 current and former primary and secondary school
teachers ðas well as a sample of administratorsÞ. The data allow study of the
labormarket outcomes and career trajectories of teachers and how they are
affected by the school voucher system and other changes affecting their
wages or working conditions. They contain rich retrospective information
on education and training and labor force history ðtotal teaching and other
experienceÞ, aswell as 5 years of detailed information on the type of schools
in which the teachers/administrators worked. The data also include demo-
graphic information ðage, gender, fertility, marital status, and family back-
groundÞ, starting wage, current wage, hours worked, type of labor mar-
ket contract, and information on occupational conditions. Our analysis is
restricted to individuals in the ELD data who obtained their teaching cer-
tification after 1990.12 There are 1,401 such individuals, for whom there are
8,147 observations.
The discrete choice dynamic programming ðDCDPÞ model is solved
using standard methods ðsee Keane, Todd, and Wolpin 2010Þ, and the pa-
rameters are estimated by simulated method of moments. This estimation
procedure permits combining moments from our different data sources
ðthe EPS and the ELD data setsÞ.13 After estimating the model, we use it
to examine how teacher labor supply, both overall and in the public and
private teaching sectors, responds to compensation policies. Results show
11 The first round of data were collected under the survey name Historia La-
boral y Seguridad Social ðHLSSÞ. These data were collected by the Microdata
Center at the University of Chile, under the leadership of David Bravo.
12 As noted, the teacher’s union was reinstated in 1991, which led to a re-
structuring of teacher wages. For this reason, we only use in estimation teachers
who have been working under the new system. See further discussion below.
13 Our estimation approach incorporates weights needed to adjust for over-
sampling of teachers in unsubsidized schools in the ELD and for stratified sam-
pling in the EPS.
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that the teaching sector is composed on the whole of relatively higher-
productivity individuals, as captured by the unobserved types in themodel,
that receive higher wage offers in comparison to the nonteaching sector.
Within teaching, the private schooling sectors ðboth subsidized and un-
subsidizedÞ attract higher productivity individuals than does themunicipal
sector. Simulations based on the estimated model show that increasing the
municipal sector wage by 20% would increase the number of certified
teachers but would not increase the “quality” of teachers employed, as
the higher wage also attracts lower-productivity types into the teaching
profession.14
An important distinction between municipal wage offers and private
schooling sector wage offers is that the municipal sector has a rigid sched-
ule in which everyone is paid according to their teaching experience and
not according to other productivity attributes ðe.g., teaching abilityÞ. Our
simulations show that setting the municipal wage schedule equal to the
wage offer function used in the private voucher sector, which distinguishes
among productivity types, would generate increases in teacher quality
within the municipal sector at the expense of lower teacher quality in the
private voucher sector.We also simulate the effect of eliminating the private
voucher sector as an employment option, whichwould increase the quality
of teachers who then choose to teach in the municipal schools but would
lower the overall average quality of teachers in all sectors. Our empirical
results show support for the concern that private voucher schools attract
better teachers than municipal schools, largely because they pay higher-
productivity teachers more. However, the existence of the private voucher
sector also draws higher-productivity individuals into teaching and im-
proves the overall pool of teachers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the related literature
on teacher labor markets. Section III describes the model, and Section IV
describes the estimation approach. Section V discusses the data sources
and sample restrictions. Section VI presents the parameter estimates and
results based on model simulations.
II. Related Literature
There is an extensive literature that analyzes the determinants of entry
into and exit from the teaching profession in the United States and in
Europe. A smaller literature is concerned with teacher quality andwhether
and to what extent wage policies can affect teacher quality. We summarize
the literature below, grouping the studies into whether they focus on
14 Manski ð1987Þ reports a similar finding for a static occupational choice model
estimated on US data.
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teacher entry, teacher retention, or teacher quality. We also briefly sum-
marize a related literature on the effects of school voucher systems on the
productivity of private and public schools.
A. Teacher Entry
An early study byManski ð1987Þ used theNational Longitudinal Survey
of the High School Class of 1972 ðNLS-72Þ to estimate probit models for
the teacher/nonteacher occupational choice decision. Manski finds that a
general pay increase does not improve teacher quality because it attracts
both low- and high-quality teachers to the profession. However, he finds
that a 10% increase in teaching salaries, coupled with a minimum SAT
score requirement, would maintain the supply of teachers and, at the same
time, raise their average academic ability compared to all college graduates.
Shin and Moon ð2006Þ, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Women, estimates that higher relative salaries are effective in inducing
female college graduates to enter into teaching.15 Bacolod ð2007Þ, using the
National Center for Education Statistics Baccalaureate and Beyond Lon-
gitudinal Study, estimates nested logit models for the decision to enter into
the teaching profession and the decision of whether to teach in urban,
suburban, or rural schools. She finds that salaries are important in the
occupational entry decision and that working conditions are important in
determining where new graduates choose to teach.
Using British 1980 Graduate Cohort data, Dolton ð1990Þ finds that rel-
ative starting earnings in teaching and earnings growth are positively re-
lated to the probability of becoming a teacher and to teacher retention. Dol-
ton andMavromaras ð1994Þ investigate howBritish graduates’ occupational
choices changed between 1970 and 1980 with reference to the choice of
becoming a teacher. They find that the salary responsiveness of females is
less than that of males and that the responsiveness declines over time for
both females and males.16 Wolter and Denzler ð2004Þ, using surveys of
graduates of Swiss universities for 1981–2001, estimate selection models
for salaries of teachers and nonteachers and find positive self-selection of
teachers into teaching. Using data for the Norwegian teacher labor market,
Falch ð2010Þ estimates the elasticity of teacher labor supply to be about 1.4,
with a range of 1.0 to 1.9, depending on the model specification. Hernani-
Limarino ð2005Þ examines how well teachers are paid relative to compa-
15 His estimates control for choice of college majors, but they do not investigate
what determines the choice of college major.
16 The paper also presents a counterfactual prediction of the decisions that each
cohort would have made had they experienced the market conditions of the other
and estimates a decomposition of the changes in the average probabilities of be-
coming a teacher due to remunerative and other factors.
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rable nonteachers in 17 Latin American countries. He finds that relative
salaries for teachers vary widely across Latin America, with teachers in some
countries ðArgentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama,
Paraguay, and PeruÞ paid more on average than other workers with com-
parable education, teachers in Nicaragua paid less on average, and teachers
in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico,
Uruguay, and Venezuela paid roughly the same.
Mizala and Romaguera ð2005Þ describe changes over time in the teacher
salary structure in Chile. In the 1980s, teachers experienced a 32% decline
in real salaries due to governmental budgetary reductions, and the num-
ber of students entering education programs dropped 43%. As previously
noted, the teachers’ union was reinstated in the early 1990s. Between 1990
and 2002, real teachers’ salaries increased 156%. There was a 39% increase
in the number of education students, and the average score on the college
entry examination for applicants to education programs increased 16%.
B. Teacher Retention
Many teachers exit teaching after fairly short employment durations.
There have been a number of studies examining the decision to exit from
teaching in the United States. Many have used state-level data on teachers
working in particular localities, including Michigan ðMurnane and Olsen
1989Þ; North Carolina ðMurnane and Olsen 1990; Clotfelter et al. 2008;
Guarino, Brown, andWyse 2011Þ; Washington ðTheobald 1990; Theobald
and Gritz 1996Þ; New York ðReese 1991; Brewer 1996; Mont and Rees
1996; Ondrich, Pas, and Yinger 2008Þ; South Carolina ðRichards and Sheu
1992Þ; Texas ðHanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 1999Þ; Pennsylvania ðGreen-
baum 2002Þ; Missouri ðPodgursky,Monroe, andWatson 2004Þ;Wisconsin
ðImazeki 2005Þ; and Georgia ðScafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2006Þ.
The results indicate that salaries paid to teachers are negatively related to
their propensities to exit teaching and positively related to durations in first
teaching positions. A common finding is that salary effects are larger for
men than for women. Finally, the estimates generally indicate that teachers
with higher qualifications ðas measured by test scores and degree subjectÞ
and those who live in areas with higher average nonteaching salaries are
more likely to leave teaching.17
A limitation of most of administrative state-level data sets is that they do
not follow teachers who move out of state. Stinebrickner ð1998, 2001a,
2001bÞ uses individual-level survey data from theNLS-72, in which teach-
ers who move are followed. Stinebrickner ð1998Þ analyzes data for people
17 For example, Ingersoll ð2003Þ, based on the United States Schools and Staffing
Survey and Teacher Follow-up Survey data on public school teachers from 1987 to
2000, reports that 40%–50% of beginning teachers leave by the end of their fifth
year, with higher exits in high-poverty and urban schools and with reported
reasons for exiting including job dissatisfaction due to low salaries, lack of support,
discipline, or pursuit of better jobs/careers.
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certified as teachers in the period 1975–85; the duration of the first teach-
ing spell was 4 years or less for half of these individuals. He estimates a
proportional hazards model for the decision to exit teaching that includes
observable demographic and school characteristics as well as school- and
individual-level unobservable heterogeneity. He finds that the lengths of
teachers’ first spells in teaching are more responsive to salaries than to
improved working conditions, such as smaller student-teacher ratios. He
also findsmarriage and fertility to be important determinants of exiting the
teaching profession.
Stinebrickner ð2001aÞ uses aDCDP framework similar to the onewe use
tomodel the relationship between personal characteristics, salaries, and the
decision process of certified teachers. In each school year, themodel allows
teachers to choose among teaching, nonteaching, and leisure options. The
estimated model is used to simulate two counterfactual policies: a uniform
teacher salary increase of 25% and an increase on average of 25%, with the
amount of the raise increasing with the Scholastic Aptitude Test ðSATÞ
score of the teacher ðas a proxy for ability or qualityÞ.His simulations show
that salary increases are more likely to reduce the amount of time spent in
nonteaching employment than they are to reduce time spent out of the
labor force altogether. Thewage effect on the decision to continueworking
as a teacher is greater for men than for women. Both policies raise the
fraction of years spent in teaching by approximately the same amount ð0.48
to 0.72Þ, but they differ in the extent to which they attract high-quality
teachers, as measured by SAT scores.18
Wiswall ð2007Þ extends Stinebrickner’s ð2001aÞ occupational choice model
to allow for a preliminary stage in which potential teachers decide whether
to obtain certification. He estimates a dynamic discrete choice model that
he uses to analyze the effects of changes in teacher licensing policy. He finds
that more stringent licensing rules reduce teacher labor supply and average
teacher quality.
Dolton and van der Klaauw ð1995, 1999Þ analyze decisions to leave the
teaching profession within a competing risks framework.19 The data ana-
lyzed are a sample of individuals who graduated from UK universities in
1980 over the years from 1980 to 1987. Their results indicate the impor-
tance of teacher salaries and opportunity wages as determinants of teacher
turnover.
Finally, the Falch ð2011Þ study described above also examines the effect
of salaries on teacher leaving decisions using a natural experiment approach.
Teachers in schools with a lot of prior teacher vacancies received a salary
18 Stinebrickner ð2001bÞ presents a parallel study using a DCDP framework
with a more flexible structure for unobserved heterogeneity but with similar re-
sults with regard to teacher supply responsiveness to salary increases.
19 The econometric model allows for a flexible semiparametric specification of
the duration dependence structure and of the unobserved heterogeneity distri-
bution in the exit-specific hazard functions.
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premium of about 10% during 1993–94 to 2002–3. Using a school fixed
effects model, Falch finds that the salary premium reduces the probability
of voluntary quits by 6 percentage points, which implies a short-run labor
supply elasticity of about 1.25.
C. Teacher Quality
Ballou and Podgursky ð1995Þ use estimates of entry and exit behavior
from other studies to simulate the impact of changing teacher salaries on
teacher quality. They conclude that a 20% increase in salaries would have
little impact on teacher quality, because higher salaries reduce exits, which
lowers the number of teaching vacancies and reduces incentives to invest
in teacher training, particularly for higher-ability individuals with good
opportunities elsewhere. They argue that to raise teacher quality, salary
increases should be targeted toward those with higher abilities. Ballou and
Podgursky ð1997Þuse data from the Schools and Staffing Surveys ðSASSÞof
1987–88 and 1990–91, the Surveys of Recent College Graduates ðSRCGÞ,
and SAT scores to examine patterns in teacher pay and teacher quality ðas
indicated by SAT scoresÞ in the 1980s among more than 8,000 public
schools. They find no significant relationship between state-level changes
in teacher salaries and changes in SAT scores or the share of high school
students intending to major in education between 1979 and 1989.
Figlio ð2002Þ uses panel data on new teachers from the SASS supple-
mented withCommonCoreData ðCCDÞ and data from theCensus ofGov-
ernments for newly hired teachers in public school districts that changed their
salaries between 1987–88 and 1993–94 to investigate whether school districts
can improve the quality of the teachers they hire ðas indicated by their hav-
ing graduated from selective colleges and majored in the subject matter they
teachÞ by unilaterally increasing teacher salaries. For nonunion school dis-
tricts, he finds a significant positive relation between teacher salaries and that
district’s probability of hiringwell-qualified teachers. This relationship, how-
ever, is not found in unionized school districts.
Chen ð2009Þ examines the phenomenon of an oversupply of teachers but
a shortage of qualified teachers in Indonesia. Using a sample of college-
educated workers from the 2001–8 Indonesian Labor Force Surveys and a
structural model, he estimates the effect of a proposed teacher law, which
could give a significant pay increase ði.e., a 100% teacher salary increase for
certified teachers with a minimum 4-year college education or aboveÞ. He
finds that the relative salary of teachers and of alternative occupations
significantly influence teacher entry decision. He also finds that the wage
rate set by the teacher law would increase the share of teachers approxi-
mately from 16% to 30% of the college-educated labor force.
Using data from Chile, Tincani ð2014Þ evaluates the costs and impact of
teacher labor market policies on student outcomes. She estimates an equi-
librium model of entry into teaching, sorting of teachers across schools,
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parental school choice, andprivate schools’wage and tuition setting. Sheuses
the estimated model to simulate the effects of different pay and recruitment
schemes. She finds that, compared to across-the-board wage increases, wage
changes tied to teachers’ skill levels aremore cost effective at increasingmean
student achievement and decreasing the achievement gap by income. Unlike
Tincani ð2014Þ, the current paper does not examine the equilibrium policy
response of parents’ and private schools’ optimal behavior, and it does not
quantify impacts in terms of student outcomes. However, the model in this
paper is dynamic, capturing the forward-looking nature of career decisions,
whereas Tincani ð2014Þ uses a static model. Parameter estimates are unaf-
fected by the fact that parental behavior is not modeled. Preferences over
student characteristics are captured in the model by sector-specific non-
pecuniary preference parameters. Sector-specific wage parameters, which
are used to infer productivity, are also estimated without bias given that the
model accounts for self-selection into sectors.
D. Effects of Voucher Systems on School Productivity
There is a growing literature analyzing the effects of voucher reforms on
productivity in public and private schools. Bohlmark and Lindahl ð2008Þ
analyze the effects of voucher reform introduced in Sweden in 1992. Prior
to that time, public schools were virtually the only type of school available.
The reform increased the availability of private schools, with the degree
of privatization varying significantly across municipalities and over time.
Bohlmark and Lindahl ð2008Þ use a difference-in-difference strategy com-
paring outcomes for cohorts who were exposed and not exposed to the
reform and living in municipalities with and without private schools, fo-
cusing on ninth-grade students. They find significant short-term effects of
private school enrollment over the short term on ninth-grade GPA and on
the fraction of students choosing the academic high school track but no
longer-term effects. Sandstro¨m and Bergstro¨m ð2005Þ also analyze the
effects of competition on public schools, using Swedish data and using a
sample selection model to take into account endogeneity of the choice of
school type. The study finds that private school competition promotes
improvement in public schools on nationwide standardized test and higher
average grades.
A few papers examine the effects of new tuition tax credit policies that
effectively reduce the relative price of private schools. Figio andHart ð2014Þ
examine the effects of a means-tested tax credit, the Florida Tax Credit,
introduced in 2001. They use a difference-in-difference strategy that com-
pares the change in test scores in public schools in areas that had a high or
low degree of private school penetration when the tax credit was intro-
duced. The study finds modestly higher test scores for public school stu-
dents stemming from increased competition. Chan ð2009Þ uses a similar
empirical strategy in analyzing the effects of the 2002 Ontario tuition tax
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credit, which increased access to private schools throughout Ontario. Also
using a difference-in-difference analysis, the study finds that public schools
that faced a greater degree of competition from private schools experienced
greater gains in students’ test passing rates.
A study by Card, Dooley, and Payne ð2008Þ uses data from Ontario,
Canada, to examine whether a higher degree of competition between the
public school system and a Catholic school system that receives equal
public funding leads to improved productivity, as measured by test score
gains between the third and sixth grades. In particular, it looks at how test
scores respond to local school openings. The paper estimates a significant
but modest-sized impact of competition on the growth rate of student
achievement and finds that extending competition to all students would
increase average test scores by 6%–8% of a standard deviation. Gibbons,
Silva, andMachin ð2008Þ analyze whether a higher degree of school choice
or school competition improves educational outcomes, using administra-
tive data on students in primary schools in southeast England. Using an
instrumental variables strategy to address concerns about potential non-
random sorting of pupils or schools, they find no evidence for a relation-
ship between choice or competition and educational outcomes. However,
they find that a certain type of school ðcalled Voluntary Aided schoolsÞ
experiences better outcomes when there is a higher degree of local school
competition. West and Woessmann ð2010Þ use student-level data from
29 countries to analyze whether the share of students in private schools leads
to higher achievement on the PISA ðProgram for International Student As-
sessmentÞ mathematics, science, and reading exams. Their empirical ap-
proach uses historical shares of Catholics living in the country at the end
of the nineteenth century as an instrument for the share of private schools
today. They find that the share of private schools significantly affects stu-
dent achievement. Also, much of the positive effect is observed for students
attending public schools, suggesting that the benefit comes through increased
competition.
There are a few studies examining the relationship between test score
performance and private school competition using Chilean data. Gallego
ð2002Þ examines changes in SIMCE national standardized test scores
between 1994 and 1997 and finds that competition has a positive effect on
educational achievement in general but also that the private subsidized
schools attract and accept only the academically better students. Auguste
and Valenzuela ð2003Þ analyze the relationship between test scores ðin the
year 2000Þ and school competition, using an instrumental variables ap-
proach to address the potential endogeneity of the school competitionmea-
sure; they find that more competition increases test scores.20 However,
Hsieh and Urquiola ð2006Þ reach a different conclusion based on a com-
parison of average test scores in communities that experienced a greater or
20 Community population and distance to the closest city serve as instruments.
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lesser increase in private school enrollment. Using community-level data,
they find that average standardized test scores did not rise faster in com-
munities where private sector enrollment expanded more. Rather, aver-
age repetition and grade-for-age worsened in such areas relative to other
communities.21
Vegas ð2002Þ uses a data set of teachers in Santiago, Chile, that was
collected in 1998–99 that provides information on teacher characteristics
and on teachers’ perceptions of the schools in which they work and on
school management. The teacher data are merged with school-level data
on student achievement from national assessment data ðthe SIMCE dataÞ.
She finds that differences within sectors in student outcomes and student
background and in teacher characteristics are greater than differences be-
tween sectors and that a great deal of the variation in student outcomes
is unexplained. She finds teacher education, decentralization of decision
making, and teacher autonomy to be important factors in explaining stu-
dent outcomes.
III. Model
This section describes the model that we develop and estimate to ana-
lyze the initial decision to become certified to teach and subsequent de-
cisions about whether to work, whether to teach, and, if teaching, whether
to teach in a public, private-subsidized, or private-unsubsidized school.
The DCDP framework that we adopt incorporates forward-looking
behavior in which individuals face uncertainty about their future pref-
erences, wage offers, fertility, and layoffs. Model parameters are estimated
using information on demographic characteristics ðgender, age at certifi-
cation, fertilityÞ, teacher certification, work sector choices, wages, and lay-
offs. The estimation sample is restricted to college graduates who gradu-
ated after 1990.22
Individuals are assumed to make choices that maximize in each period
their expected discounted value of remaining lifetime utility. In the first
model period, individuals decide whether to become certified to teach or
to graduate without certification. Thereafter, individuals who have been
certified to teach receive wage offers from schools in the municipal sector
ðMÞ, in the private subsidized/voucher sector ðVÞ, and in the private
unsubsidized sector ðUÞ. They also receive nonteaching wage offers ðNTÞ.
Those who are not certified to teach only receive offers from the non-
teaching sector. Both certified and noncertified individuals can also opt to
not work and remain at home ðHÞ. After receiving the offers from the
21 A potential limitation of the analysis is that it examines differences in test
scores over time, though the SIMCE tests were not comparable over time prior to
1998, when test equating was introduced.
22 Teaching in Chile requires a college degree. Additional sample restrictions are
described in detail below.
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different sectors, individualswho are certifieddecidewhether to stayhome,
work in one of the three types of schools, or work in the nonteaching
sector.23 As described below, individuals also face the possibility of being
laid off. The career decision model ends at retirement, assumed to be age
65 for men and 60 for women, the ages at which retirees could obtain
pensions during the time period considered.24
Teaching experience and nonteaching experience accumulate endog-
enously in the model. Modeling the endogenous evolution of teaching
and nonteaching experience separately is necessary because teachingwages
depend on teaching experience.25 The initial conditions of the model are
gender; the age at which individuals are certified to teach, aGi ∈ f22;
23; : : : ; 40g, for those certified, or else the age of college graduation; and
the number of children at the time of certification. The model allows for
different unobserved “types” of individuals, denoted by k. Types are al-
lowed to differ in skill endowments that may affect wage offers, fertility
preferences, and the nonpecuniary value attached to each alternative, as
described below.26
A. Decision to Become Certified to Teach
In the initial period, at the age of graduation/certification aGi , individ-
ual i decides whether to become certified to teach ðeither by earning an
undergraduate or postgraduate degree in educationÞ.27 The flow utilities
23 The model does not allow individuals to work in the nonteaching sector before
obtaining a teaching certification. In the ELD sample, after applying our sample
selection, we observe only seven people with some nonteaching experience at the age
of teaching certification. These people have on average 2.3 years of nonteaching
experience. In estimation, we set their nonteaching experience at certification to zero.
24 We assume that the value function is zero after retirement. In principle, different
retirement schemes in private and public schools may affect the sectoral choices. How-
ever, our sample of teachers comprises young cohorts and, because of discounting,
the effect of introducing different retirement schemes would likely be small.
25 We do not model accumulation of teaching experience by sector separately
because in Chile the law states that teaching experience is rewarded by municipal
school wages independently of the school sector in which that teaching experience
was accumulated.
26 The types introduce a dimensionality reduction that allows us to identify
productivity in different sectors without relying only on the individuals who are
observed in multiple sectors, as would be necessary if we estimated a person-
specific fixed effect. See Keane and Wolpin ð1997Þ.
27 There are four ways one can become certified to teach in Chile: ðiÞ degree
in education ð6–11 semestersÞ, ðiiÞ degree in another area ð10–12 semestersÞ 1
postgraduate degree in education ð2–4 semestersÞ, ðiiiÞ teaching experience1 short
university degree ð2–5 semestersÞ, and ðivÞ teaching experience 1 government
authorization. According to the teacher census ðIdoneidad DocentesÞ, 90% of all
teachers get certified through channel i, 5% through channel ii, and 5% through
channels iii and iv. In the model, we do not distinguish between channels i and ii,
and we do not allow for channels iii and iv.
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associated with the education ðEÞ and the nonteaching options ðNEÞ are
UEiaG 5 o
k
lE0kIðtypei 5 kÞ1 lE1D fi 1 lE2aGi 1 hEi ;
UNEiaG 5 0;
where Iðtype5 kÞ is an indicator equal to one if the individual is of type k
and Dfi is a dummy variable that equals one if female.
28 It is assumed that
the preference shock follows a normal distribution, hEi ∼Nð0; j2hÞ.
B. Sector Decisions
Individuals who earn an education degree choose in subsequent peri-
ods ðuntil retirementÞ among five mutually exclusive and exhaustive alter-
natives: whether to teach in a public municipal ðMÞ, or a private-subsidized
ðVÞ, or a private-unsubsidized ðUÞ school; to work in the nonteaching
ðNTÞ sector; or to stay home ðHÞ. We denote dð1Þia 5 1 if M is chosen by
individual i at age a ðand zero otherwiseÞ, dð2Þia 5 1 if V is chosen ðand zero
otherwiseÞ, dð3Þia 5 1 if U is chosen ðand zero otherwiseÞ, dð4Þia 5 1 if NT is
chosen ðand zero otherwiseÞ, and dð5Þia 5 1 if H is chosen ðand zero
otherwiseÞ.
Period-specificutilities associatedwithworkingdependonwages aswell
as on nonpecuniary factors.29 The wage offer schedule in the municipal
sector depends only on total teaching experience, reflecting the fact that
wages are calculated using a rigid formula according to guidelines set by
negotiations between the teachers’ union and the government. The wage
offer schedule is given by
lnðwMia Þ5 aM0 1 aM1 txia 1 aM2 tx2ia 1 εMia ;
where wMia is the wage offer to individual i of age a and txia is individual i
0
s
total teaching experience ðacross all teaching sectorsÞ. Unobserved skill en-
dowments and gender variables do not enter the municipal wage equation
to reflect the institutional feature that municipal wages are centrally deter-
minedby theChileanTeacher’s Statute anddo not vary by productivity nor
gender. The unobserved component of the wage offer, εMia , reflects some
adjustments to wages that depend on factors such as working conditions
and managerial responsibilities.30
28 The utility for the noneducation option is normalized to zero because only
the difference in utilities can be identified.
29 Utility is assumed to be linear in consumption and additively separable in the
nonpecuniary aspects of employment and home. There is thus nomotive for saving
or borrowing, and consumption is set equal to wages without loss of generality.
30 Bravo et al. ð2010Þ contains a detailed description of the actual municipal wage
formulae from the Estatuto Docente. Consistent with our model, gender does not
enter the wage and years of teaching experience do not depend on the sector in
which that experience was accumulated. On top of the teaching experience bonus,
which is the largest bonus, there are around 20 other types of bonuses that depend
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Wage offers in the other education sectors ðV and UÞ and in the non-
education sector ðNTÞ are assumed to be based on individual skills. An
individual’s skill level in the teaching sectors depends on total teaching
experience ðas in the municipal sectorÞ, gender, unobserved type, and an
idiosyncratic shock, ε jia; j5 V; U. An individual’s skill level in the non-
teaching sector depends on nonteaching experience, ntxia; total teaching
experience, whether the individual has an education degree, Dei , gender,
unobserved type, and an idiosyncratic shock, εNTia : Wage offers in these
sectors are given by
lnðwViaÞ5 o
k
Iðtypei 5 kÞaV0k 1 aV1 txia 1 aV2 tx2ia 1 aV3Dfi 1 εVia;
lnðwUiaÞ5 o
k
Iðtypei 5 kÞaU0k 1 aU1 txia 1 aV2 tx2ia 1 aU3 Dfi 1 εUia:
lnðwNTia Þ5 o
k
Iðtypei 5 kÞaNT0k 1 aNT1 txia 1 aNT2 ntxia 1 aNT3 ntx2ia
1 aNT4 D
e
i 1 a
NT
5 D
f
i 1 ε
NT
ia ;
It is assumed that all ðlogÞ wage shocks are normally distributed and in-
dependent; any correlation in wage offers across sectors comes through
the unobserved types.31
Period-specific utilities also depend on nonpecuniary aspects of sector-
specific jobs. Individuals are assumed to vary in their valuations according
to their type. In addition, individuals incur search costs associated with
switching work sectors, c s, being laid off, c l, and returning to work after a
period of absence, cw. The per-period utilities at ages a > aG associated
with each work option j5M; V;U;NT for an individual i of unobserved
permanent type k ∈ 1; 2; : : : K are
on variables that are not observed in our data set. They are not included in our wage
equation. The shock in our wage equation is an approximation error that captures
these bonuses. Examples of these bonuses are those related to managerial respon-
sibilities, to teaching special types of courses, and to teaching in schools with more
than 250 students. The R2 for the variables used as moments in the estimation,
wagej Dj, j ∈ fM; V;Ug, where Dj is a dummy equal to one if sector j is chosen,
and equal to zero otherwise, represents a lower bound for the R2 of the fit of the
accepted wage. The fit in municipal schools—where unobserved heterogeneity is
not allowed to enter the wage equation—is similar ðslightly betterÞ than the fit in
private unsubsidized and subsidized schools. Specifically, the R2 for municipal
schools is .83; for voucher schools it is .82, and for private unsubsidized schools it
is .81. This suggests that the assumed municipal wage equation is a good approxima-
tion to the governmental formulae.
31 Like in a classical Ben-Porath framework ðBen-Porath 1967Þ, the wages re-
flect the product of skills and the price of those skills. Under the normalization of
skill prices, the constants in the log-wages are identified up to scale ðsee, e.g., Heck-
man and Sedlacek 1985Þ. Therefore, it is possible to rank types in terms of sector-
specific productivity, as we do in the section with the empirical results.
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UMia 5w
M
ia 1 o
k
bM0kIðtypei 5 kÞ1 csICs 1 cwI½dð5Þi;a21 5 11 clI½Dli;a 5 1;
UVia 5w
V
ia 1 o
k
bV0kIðtypei 5 kÞ1 csICs 1 cwI½dð5Þi;a21 5 11 clI½Dli;a 5 1;
UUia 5w
U
ia 1 o
k
bU0kIðtypei 5 kÞ1 csICs 1 cwI½dð5Þi;a21 5 11 clI½Dli;a 5 1;
UNTia 5w
NT
ia 1 c
sICs 1 c
wI½dð5Þi;a21 5 11 clI½Dli;a 5 1;
where ICs 5 I½di;a21 dia; dð5Þi;a21 1; Dli;a21 5 0 is an indicator for whether the
choice represents a switch in sectors, Dli;a equals one if the individual was
laid off ðand zero otherwiseÞ, and bj0k represents the nonpecuniary value of
alternative j5M; V; U for type k. As seen, an individual who is laid off
receives job offers in the same period as the layoff occurs. Finally, the
utility associated with staying at home ðnot workingÞ is
UHia 5 o
k
bH0k 1 b
H
1 nkiaIðai ≤ 50Þ1 bH2 nkiaDfi Iðai ≤ 50Þ1 hHia ;
where nk is the number of children. It is assumed that hHia ∼Nð0; jHÞ ∀ i; a.
The utility from staying home depends on the number of children (nk ia),
with the dependence gender-specific, restricted to individuals aged 50 or less
for whom the children would still be of younger ages. The nonpecuniary
value associated with working in the nonteaching ðNTÞ sector is normal-
ized to zero; only the differences in nonpecuniary values are identified.
Fertility is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process. In every
time period, until age 45 for women and age 50 for men, there is a positive
probability, denoted by pfia of having a child.
32 That is, nk i;a11 5 nk ia 1 1
with probability pfia, nki;a11 5 nk ia with probability 12 p
f
ia. The probability
of having a child depends on the individual’s type, gender, the number of
children she or he has thus far ðnk ia21Þ, and whether there was a birth in the
previous period ðDbi;a21Þ.33 It is specified as a logit,
pfia 5
exp

o
k
g
f
0kIðtype5 kÞ1 g f1ai 1 g f2a2i 1 g f3aiDfi 1 g f4nkia21 1 g f5Dbi;a21

11 exp

o
k
g
f
0kIðtype5 kÞ1 g f1ai 1 g f2a2i 1 g f3aiDfi 1 g f4nkia 1 g f5Dbi;a21
 :
As in the case of fertility, layoffs are treated as an exogenous stochastic
process. For individuals in the teaching sector with 15 or fewer years of
teaching experience, there is a positive probability of being laid off. Indi-
32 In our sample, only 1.06% of fathers have a child after age 50, and only 0.64%
of mothers have a child over age 45.
33 Births are unlikely to occur in consecutive years.
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viduals with more experience are assumed to have tenure and to not face
a risk of lay-off or nonrenewal.34 The probability of dismissal/nonrenewal
for a teacher, plTia , is given by
plTia 5
expðglT0 1 glT1 tx iaÞ
11 expðglT0 1 glT1 tx iaÞ
:
For individuals working in the nonteaching sector, we similarly assume
that there is a positive probability of being laid off that only affects
individuals with 15 or fewer years of work experience. The probability of
incurring a layoff, plNTia , is given by
plNTia 5
expðglNT0 1 glNT1 ntx iaÞ
11 expðglNT0 1 glNT1 ntx iaÞ
:
In estimation, we assume that there are three unobserved types ðK 5 3Þ
and that the type distribution follows a multinomial logit distribution that
depends on the state variables, Qia.
35
Prðki 5 t j QiaÞ5 e
Q
0
ia~qt
o3
t51e
Q 0ia~qt
We normalize q1 5 0 and rewrite the probability of a type as
Prðki 5 t j XiaÞ5 e
Q
0
iaqt
11 o3
t52e
Q 0iaqt
:
The state space consists of Qia 5 ½1Dfi txia ntxia nkia di;a21 Dli;a Dei
aGi D
b
i;a210.36 Specifically, in the above expression,
Q
0
iaqt 5 qt0 1 qt1D
f
i 1 qt2txia 1 qt3ntxia 1 qt4nkia 1 qt6d
ð4Þ
i;a21 1 qt5D
l
i;a
1 qt6D
e
i 1 qt7a
G
i 1 qt8D
b
i;a21 1 qt91ðELDÞ:
34 Very few people with more than 15 years of experience report being laid off.
In the sample, 1.25% of all teachers with at least 16 years of teaching experience are
fired or do not get their contracts renewed, as opposed to 2.85% of less experienced
teachers.
35 We do not allow types to change over time: types capture permanent un-
observed heterogeneity. The reason that the type probabilities depend on time-
varying variables is because of individuals’ self-selection. Individuals are making
choices over time that endogenously determine which point in the state space they
reach in each time period. Therefore, the distribution of unobserved types across
the state space varies over time. To capture this, as an approximation, we let the
type probability depend on time-varying state variables.
36 In the initial time period after graduation, teaching experience, nonteaching
experience, the indicator for previous period layoff, and the indicator for a birth in
the previous period ðwhich is not observed in the dataÞ are set to zero.
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The last term in the summation is an indicator for whether the individual is
from the ELD sample, which allows the type distribution to differ between
the ELD and EPS samples. The inclusion of the ELD dummy accounts for
the effect of choice-based sampling on the distribution of the unobservable
types.
IV. Estimation Approach
The model does not have an analytical solution and is therefore solved
numerically by backward recursion. Model parameters are obtained by
the method of simulated moments, choosing the parameters to minimize
the weighted average distance between the outcomes simulated under the
model and the outcomes observed in the data.
A. Numerical Solution of the Dynamic Programming Problem
We denote the nonstochastic elements of the state space by QðaÞ and the
stochastic elements ðthewage and preference shocksÞ by~εðaÞ. Given values
for the model parameters g, the individual’s maximization problem can be
written in any period in recursive form. Specifically, the Bellman equation
is
VðQðaÞ; ~εðaÞ; gÞ5 max
dia
fUia 1 dEmax½VðQða1 1Þ; ~εða1 1Þ; gÞ j QðaÞ; diag;
for ai such that ai < aR, where d is the discount factor and aR is the age of
retirement. In the last decision period, the future Emax is set to 0. The full
solution of the dynamic programming problem is the set ofEmax functions
for all ages. The dynamic programming problem is solved using standard
backward recursion methods as described, for example, in Keane et al.
ð2010Þ.
B. Parameter Estimation
We estimate the model parameters using a conditional simulated meth-
ods of moments approach.37 The moments correspond to the squared dif-
ference between actual outcomes ðwages, occupational choicesÞ for dif-
ferent groups of individuals ðe.g., men, women of different agesÞ and one
period ahead model-based forecasts of the outcomes, conditional on state
variables. Let a0 and a
0
denote theminimumage andmaximumage observed
in the data, A the set of all ages, andNA the cardinality of the set A. Let Qia
denote the state space of individual i at age a, where i5 1; : : : ; NI, qia ∈ Qia
an element of the state space, and Zia ⊂ Qia a subset of the state space.
Let yia denote an observed outcome measure, which in our application
corresponds to wages or indicators for whether a particular choice was
37 See, e.g., Gourieroux and Monfort ð2002Þ.
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made, and y^iaskðgÞ denote the predicted value of yia given model parameters
g, for simulation number s ðwhere s5 1; : : : SÞ, and for an individual of
type k, where k ∈ f1; : : : ; Kg. The predicted outcome value y^iaðgÞ is
obtained by integrating over the unobserved type distribution and taking
the average over simulation draws. That is,
y^iaðgÞ5 1
S
oSs51o
K
k51y^iaskðg; Qa; typei 5 kÞ Prðtypei 5 k j QaÞ;
where Prðtypei 5 k j QaÞ integrates to one and, as noted, is estimated by a
multinomial logit model. The type proportions depend on the state var-
iables ðincluding the fixed initial conditions in the model, gender and age
of teaching certificationÞ. If the outcome is discrete ð1 or 0Þ, then y^iaðgÞ is
the predicted probability ðdivided by 100Þ of making the choice of 1 ðe.g.,
the probability of choosing to work in a particular sectorÞ.
Both the EPS data and the ELD data were collected using nonrandom
sampling schemes. The EPS data were collected by a stratified sampling
scheme. The ELD data include all individuals who were teachers in 1995
or later, and the sampling design oversampled private school teachers.
Because decisions in our model include the decision to become a teacher
and the decision with regard to teacher sector, for our purposes, the ELD
sample is a choice-based sample. Weights are included in both the ELD
and EPS data sets that reweight the sample back to random sampling
proportions ðfor the ELD sample, random conditional on being a teacher
between 1995 and 2002Þ. Our estimation procedure combines moments
from the different data sets, and we use the weights in the two data sets to
reweight the observations back to random sampling proportions.38 The
EPS sample is used to get the fraction of teachers certified. Let wi denote
the sampling weight of observation i, which does not vary by age.39 For
the ELD sample, we only use observations on outcomes of individuals
beginning with the first year after they become teachers ðwith the state
variables referring to their first year of teachingÞ.
We now consider a moment corresponding to the mean squared differ-
ence between actual and simulated outcomes for individuals with a par-
ticular subset of conditioning state variables Zia and of an age in the range
~A ∈ A. Let Di;Zia; ~A 5 1 if qia ∈ Zia and a ∈ ~A; else 5 0. Let N 5NA NI,
where NI is the number of individuals and NA the number of ages over
38 Recall that we also account for potential sample selection based on unob-
servables through the inclusion of an ELD indicator variable in the type probability
function.
39 The weights are normalized to sum to the total numbers of observations in the
data ðrespectively, for the two data setsÞ. For the EPS, we use the weights provided
in the 2004 survey. For the ELD, we use the weights provided in the 2005 survey.
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which they are observed.40 We can write the ith moment condition as
follows:41
f iNðgÞ5
1
N o
N
i51
o
a0
a5a0
ðyia 2 y^iaðgÞÞDi;Zia; ~Awi
" #
;
wherewi denotes the sampling weights. In the limit, asNI→ ` and S→ `,
the above expression converges to
Eðyia 2 y^iaðgÞ j Di;Zia; ~A 5 1ÞPrðDi;Zia; ~A 5 1Þ:
Stack all the moment conditions into them 1 vector fNðgÞ. The estimator
minimizes the criterion
g^5 argmin fNðgÞ0WNðgÞfNðgÞ;
whereWN is the m  m dimensional weighting matrix. Let VN denote the
sample variance of the moment vector. Also,W and V are the probability
limits of WN and VN. The method of moments estimator is distributed asﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
ðg^2 gÞ ∼ ðNð0; ðGWG0Þ21ðG0WVWGÞððG0WG0Þ21ÞÞ:
The optimal weighting matrix ðthe one that leads to the most efficient
GMM estimatorÞ sets WN 5 V21N . We do not use the optimal weighting
matrix in estimation, however, because it is a large matrix that is difficult
to invert in a numerically precise way. The formula given above, which
allows for a nonoptimal weighting matrix, does not require inversion ofV.
Appendix A provides detailed information on how G, V, and W are esti-
mated.
40 For ease of notation, we abstract from possibly having an unbalanced panel.
41 For wage outcomes, we match the product of the wage and the sector dummy.
For example, if yMia denotes the wage offer in sector M and D
M
ia is equal to one if
sector M is chosen, we build a simulated outcome y^Mia D^
M
ia for municipal sector
wages. The corresponding moment condition is
1
N o
N
i51
o
a0
a5a0
ðyMiaDMia 2 y^Mia D^Mia ÞDi;Zia; ~Awi:
Because the sector choice is an endogenous outcome, the simulated dummy de-
pends on the parameters and its presence introduces discontinuity in the objective
function used in estimation. To guarantee asymptotic normality, we assume the
sufficient condition for smoothness of the limiting objective function of the MSM
presented in theorem 7.1 in Newey and McFadden ð1994Þ. Under this assump-
tion, the results of theorem 7.1 apply and the estimator is asymptotically normal.
Given the complexity of the model, this assumption is imposed instead of derived
from the model primitives.
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V. Data Description and Sample Restrictions
In 2002, the Microdata Center of the Department of Economics of the
Universidad de Chile conducted a new household survey called Historia
Laboral y Seguridad Social ðHLLSÞ. In 2004, 2006, and 2009, it adminis-
tered follow-up surveys, changing the name of the survey to the Encuesta
de Proteccio´n Social ðEPS; Social Protection SurveyÞ. The data from theEPS,
as previously noted, contain demographic and labormarket information on
17,246 individuals age 15 or older, including information on household
characteristics, education, training and work history, pension plan partic-
ipation, and savings, as well as more limited information on health, assets,
disability status, and utilization of medical services. Of particular relevance
to our analysis are the questions on labor force and participation in train-
ing/education, which include retrospective labor force participation and
layoff information ðback to 1981Þ, information on educational attainment
and fertility, and information on wages for the survey years. In our esti-
mation, we use individuals who graduated from college or graduate school
and/or obtained teaching certification in or after 1990. The reason for this
restriction is that the government introduced theEstatuto Docente in 1991,
which dramatically changed teaching in municipal schools. Before its in-
troduction, municipal school teachers were not considered public employ-
ees; theywere subject to the private labor code, had less job security, and the
wages were not regulated. The Estatuo Docente introduced the wage for-
mulae for public school teachers and also increased the wage level. Because
the characteristics of the teaching profession changed so dramatically ðat
least in municipal schoolsÞ, we decided to analyze only decisions for the
subset of teachers who entered under the new system.
The second longitudinal survey we use is the Encuesta Longitudinal
Docentes ðELD; Longitudinal Survey of TeachersÞ, collected for the first
time in 2005 and 2009 for the purpose of studying the wages and working
conditions of teachers and school administrators. The survey was admin-
istered to 6,000 current and former primary and secondary school teach-
ers.42 The data contain rich retrospective information on education and
training and labor force history ðtotal teaching andother experienceÞ, aswell as
5 years of detailed information on the type of schools in which the teachers/
administrators worked. The survey also gathered demographic information
ðage, gender, fertility, marital status, family backgroundÞ, health informa-
tion, starting wages, current wages, hours worked, type of labor market con-
tract, and information on occupational conditions. Our analysis is restricted
to individuals in the ELD data who obtained their teaching certification after
42 The sampling frame for the ELD consisted of teachers in 1995 ðobtained from
the teacher censusÞ and of individuals who entered into the teaching profession
since 1995. Therefore, the ELD covers individuals who over the last 20 years were
at some point teachers.
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1990 with a certification age below or equal to age 40, of which there are
1,401 individuals. We have 8,147 person-year observations.
VI. Empirical Results
A. Parameter Estimates
Table 1 shows the estimated model parameters.43 The model was esti-
mated incorporating three unobserved types to capture unobservable het-
erogeneity. The preference parameters associatedwith having an education
degree relative to a noneducation college degree are negative for all three
types, indicating that, other things equal, people have a preference for non-
education degrees. The coefficient on the female indicator is positive, show-
ing that men dislike education degrees more than women.
The coefficients under the panel labeled “Payoff: Municipal Schools”
show the parameters of the wage-offer equation ðthe asÞ and the nonpecu-
niary returns ðthe bM00j s; j5 1; 2; 3Þ. Similarly, the panels labeled “Payoff:
Voucher Schools,” “Payoff: Unsubsidized Schools,” and “Payoff: Non-
teaching Sector” show the same parameters for the other sectors. With
respect to the wage offer functions, in accordance with union wage sched-
ules, wage offers in municipal schools depend on teaching experience but
do not differ by type or gender. On the other hand, voucher and unsub-
sidized schools, which must compete with municipal schools for teachers,
are less constrained by union wage negotiations and are thus able to dis-
criminate among teachers through the wages they offer. Similarly, wage
offers in the nonteaching sector, encompassing a variety of industries and
occupations, would be expected to vary by type ðand genderÞ.
The estimates in table 1 reveal significant differences in wage offers by
type and gender in nonmunicipal schools and in the nonteaching sector.
With respect to gender, for given experience and type, women receive a
10% lower wage offer than men in voucher schools, an 8% lower wage
offer in unsubsidized schools, and a 27% lower offer in nonteaching jobs.
There are also large differences inwage offers among the unobserved types.
Type 1s receive the lowest wage offers in all sectors and type 2s the highest
in all sectors. Relative to the municipal schools, for which all types receive
the same offers, type 1s are the only group that receives lower offers in all
of the other sectors. We therefore interpret type 1s as the lowest produc-
tivity type and type 2s as the highest.
Experience returns also differ across sectors. For example, the first year
of experience adds 5.4% to wages in voucher schools but only 2.5% in
municipal schools. After 10 years of experience, the voucher school wage
will have increased by about 40% but only by about 10% in municipal
43 Because of the relatively short panel, we did not estimate the discount factor,
which was set at 0.96.
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Table 1
Parameter Estimates for the DCDP Model
Utility of Obtaining an Education Degree Payoff: Nonteaching Sector
Type 1: l01 22.610E108 Type 1: aNT01 14.95
ð2.20E105Þ ð.017Þ
Type 2: l02 28.011E107 Type 2: aNT02 15.93
ð7.41E105Þ ð.016Þ
Type 3: l03 29.821E107 Type 3: a
NT
03 15.51
ð1.19E105Þ ð.017Þ
Female: l1 6.3901E07 Teaching experience: a
NT
1 .028
ð6.78E104Þ ð1.46E-05Þ
Age at graduation/
certificate : l2 1.280E106
Nonteaching experience:
aNT2 .055
ð198.40Þ ð6.63E-05Þ
SD: jh
18.56
ðNonteaching
experienceÞ2: aNT3 2.00243
ð.021Þ ð3.49E-06Þ
Has an education degree:
aNT4 2.176
ð3.94E-04Þ
Female: aNT5 2.286
ð3.34E-04Þ
Payoff: Municipal Schools Payoff: Home Sector
Constant term: aM0 15.00 Type 1: b
H
01 1.301E106
ð.025Þ ð1,909.97Þ
Experience: aM1 .025 Type 2: b
H
02 21.465E108
ð4.23E-05Þ ð38,343.19Þ
ðExperienceÞ2: aM2 2.0015 Type 3: bH03 3.947E105
ð1.70E-07Þ ð1,694.61Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 1:bM01 23.975E106
Number of children
 age < 51: bH1 3.120E105
ð1,145.86Þ ð135.43Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 2: bM02 4.973E106
Number of children
 female  < 51: bH1 1.120E105
ð187.09Þ ð107.37Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 3: bM03 1.235E106
ð715.21Þ
Payoff: Voucher Schools Transition Costs
Type 1: aV01 14.88 Switching sectors, not at
home last period: c s 22.524E108ð.005Þ
ð432,527.46Þ
Type 2: aV02 17.03 Laid off from teaching
last period: c l 22.394E107ð.004Þ
ð12,423.37Þ
Type 3: aV03 15.06 Home last period: c
w 27.598E106
ð.020Þ ð9,538.76Þ
Experience: aV1 .054
ð1.07E204Þ
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Log of the SD of Payoffs
ðExperienceÞ2: aV2 2.00144 Municipal sector: jM 2.347
ð1.84E206Þ ð5.01E204Þ
Female: aV3 2.105 Voucher sector: j
V 2.270
ð5.54E205Þ ð2.87E204Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 1: bV01 24.891E107
Unsubsidized sector: jU 2.765
ð866.01Þ
ð1.43E203Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 2: bV02 22.688E107
Nonteaching sector: jNT 2.119
ð543.18Þ
ð1.70E204Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 3: bV03 8.255E105
Home sector: jH 1.34E101
ð913.04Þ
ð.016Þ
Payoff: Unsubsidized Schools Fertility Process
Type 1: aU01 14.90 Type 1: g
f
01 29.25
ð.004Þ ð.039Þ
Type 2: aU02 16.70 Type 2: g
f
02 29.49
ð.013Þ ð.031Þ
Type 3: aU03 15.16 Type 3: g
f
03 2.468
ð.016Þ ð7.11E204Þ
Experience: aU1 .075 Age: g
f
1 .049
ð9.93E205Þ ð8.08E205Þ
ðExperienceÞ2: aU2 2.0020 ðAgeÞ2g f2 2.003
ð2.24E206Þ ð4.46E206Þ
Female: aU3 2.078 Age  female: g f3 2.012
ð6.20E205Þ ð7.22E206Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 1: bU01 23.081E107
Number of children: g f4 .233
ð999.64Þ
ð2.04E204Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 2: bU02 23.139E107
Birth last period: g f5 21.312
ð28,881.44Þ
ð.002Þ
Nonpecuniary,
type 3: bU03 22.804E105
ð387.88Þ
Dismissal Process
Constant: glT0 22.904
ð.005Þ
Teaching experience: glT1 2.148
ð1.80E-04Þ
Constant: glNT0 22.197
ð.003Þ
Nonteaching
experience: glNT1 2.082
ð9.11E-05Þ
Table 1 ðcontinuedÞ
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schools. The experience return is largest in the unsubsidized sector, with
the first year of experience adding 7.5% to the wage offer. The first-year
return to ðsector-specificÞ experience in the nonteaching sector is similar
to that in the voucher sector, but it declines faster with additional years of
experience. Interestingly, there is a nontrivial return ð2.8%Þ to teaching
experience in the nonteaching sector, but those with teaching certification
receive 17.6% lower wage offers in the nonteaching sector.
Type-specific choices are determined not only by wage offers but also
by the value placed on sector-specific nonpecuniary aspects of employ-
ment. Recall that the coefficients in table 1 representing these nonpecuniary
returns are relative to the returns in the nonteaching sector. Among the
teaching sectors, all of the types value most the nonpecuniary aspects of
employment in municipal schools. However, type 1s value the nonpecu-
niary aspects of employment in the nonteaching sector more than those in
the teaching sectors, while both type 2s and 3s value those in the municipal
sector more than in the nonteaching sector. Only type 1s value being at
homemore thanworking in any of the sectors. Type 2s place a greater value
Probability of Type 2 Probability of Type 3
Constant: q20 22.465 Constant: q30 2.243
ð.010Þ ð.022Þ
Female: q21 21.250 Female: q31 .035
ð.006Þ ð.018Þ
Teaching experience: q22 21.564 Teaching experience: q32 .105
ð7.60E204Þ ð5.47E205Þ
ðTeaching experienceÞ2:
q23 .135
ðTeaching experienceÞ2:
q33 .083
ð.002Þ ð.017Þ
Number of children: q24 .793 Number of children: q34 2.739
ð.012Þ ð.013Þ
Nonteaching sector last
period: q25 2.711
Nonteaching sector last
period: q35 2.566
ð.119Þ ð.003Þ
Laid off from teaching
last period: q26 5.840
Laid off from teaching
last period q36 29.350
ð.037Þ ð.010Þ
Age at graduation/
certification: q27 2.0056
Age at graduation/
certification: q37 2.080
ð.001Þ ð8.92E204Þ
Birth last period: q28 1.630 Birth last period: q38 22.500
ð.004Þ ð.013Þ
In ELD sample: qELD .315 In ELD sample: qELD 5.803
ð.094Þ ð.001Þ
NOTE.—The three types refer to three unobserved heterogeneity types included in estimating the
model. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 1 ðcontinuedÞ
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on working in the municipal sector and in the nonteaching sector than on
remaining at home, but a lower value on working in the other sectors, and
type 3s place a greater value on working in the voucher sector than on re-
maining at home, but a lower value on working in other sectors. The es-
timates for the home sector payoff also reveal that children increase the
value of remaining at home, more so for women than for men.
With respect to some of the other parameters, the transition ðsearchÞ
costs associated with switching work sectors, switching from the home
sector toworking and during a layoff are estimated to be substantial inmag-
nitude. The probability of a birth increases with age at a decreasing rate,
with births more likely for individuals with more children and less likely if
there was a birth in the previous period. The estimated parameters for the
dismissal process show that dismissals are a decreasing function of experi-
ence, both in the teaching and nonteaching sectors.
B. Discussion: Types and Teacher Productivity
As noted in, for example, Hanushek and Rivkin ð2006Þ, the literature on
the estimation of cognitive achievement production functions has devel-
oped mostly separately from the literature on teacher labor supply: the
studies that estimate teacher effectiveness from data on student test scores
abstract from teacher labor supply decisions, and vice-versa. Within the
teacher labor supply literature, different studies have used different mea-
sures of teacher quality, for example, teacher experience, qualifications, and
measures of teacher cognitive skills. In this paper, we use teacher produc-
tivity as valued by the labor market to measure teacher quality, and we
examine how productivity varies by unobserved ðand observedÞ teacher
characteristics. This is important because studies using test scores to es-
timate teacher quality find that it varies substantially among teachers and
that it is related to unobserved teacher characteristics ðsee, e.g., Rivkin,
Hanushek, and Kain 2005Þ. We study how opportunity wages in non-
teaching occupations affect the decision to enter and stay in the teaching
profession because previous studies show that wages in the nonteaching
sector are an important determinant of the decision to become a teacher
ðe.g., Dolton and Van der Klaauw 1999Þ. We adopt a rich framework in
which we allow productivity in the nonteaching sector to differ from pro-
ductivity in the teaching sector. Our estimation results show that indi-
viduals who are more productive in the nonteaching sector are also more
productive in the teaching sector. This is consistent with previous studies
that found that increasing nonteaching sector wages reduces the quality of
the teaching force ðe.g., Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab 2004Þ.
In the context of Chile, Tincani ð2014Þ finds that the measure of teacher
productivity we use affects student test scores positively; types who ob-
tain higher wages in private schools increase student test scores by more.
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Bravo, Flores, and Medrano ð2010Þ find that private school teacher wages
increase with teacher cognitive skills, as measured by the teacher’s PAA
score ðPrueba de Aptitud Acade´mica, the Chilean equivalent of the SAT
scoreÞ, and that teachers’ PAA scores are positively correlatedwith student
test scores. Finally, Correa, Parro, and Reyes ð2017Þ find positive selection
of teachers into private schools, using a Roymodel ðRoy 1951Þ, where, like
in this paper, teacher quality is measured by labor market productivity.
C. Descriptive Statistics and Model Fit
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics and evidence on the model
fit, based on one-step-ahead simulations.44 That is, for each person-year
observation, we simulate their wage offers and derive their choices con-
ditional on the observed state variables. In the data, 17.8% of female col-
lege graduates in the EPS sample have education degrees in comparison to
6.1% of men. Simulations based on the model come very close to repli-
cating these proportions.
Of the women who are certified to teach, 33.8% are employed in mu-
nicipal schools, 48.3% in voucher schools, 11.8% in unsubsidized private
schools, and 2.2% in nonteaching. For college graduates without teaching
certification, 75.7% of women are employed in comparison to 85.2% of
men. Simulations of the choice distribution based on the model are within
1–3 percentage points of the data.45 The model fit to accepted wages is also
close; the deviations are generally less than 5%.
There is a strong propensity for those with an education degree to re-
main employed in the same school sector from one year to the next. In
particular, 96.8% who are employed in a municipal school in one year are
employed in a municipal school the next year. The corresponding figure
for those in a voucher school is 96.2%, and for those in an unsubsidized
school it is 93.4%. Simulated data are quite close, 95.7%, 96.1%, and
90.8%.46
Table 3 provides information about how the types differ and about how
types are distributed in the population. The first row of the table shows
the fraction of men and women college graduates estimated to be of each
type.As seen, 73.0%of females are estimated to be of type 1, 1.8%of type 2,
and 25.3% of type 3. The type distribution is similar for men, with 72.1%
type 1, 6.0% type 2, and 22.1% type 3. The type distribution is much
different for those who chose an education degree. For women, type 3s
comprise almost three-fourths of all college graduates with an education
44 The means shown in the table incorporate sampling weights.
45 The simulations are based on 40 simulation draws.
46 Although all of these are close quantitatively to the actual data, a chi-square
test rejects the hypothesis that they are the same for all but the voucher schools.
The chi-square test does not correct the degrees of freedom for estimated param-
eters in the simulated data.
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degree, while for men, type 2s and type 3s comprise 94% of college grad-
uates with an education degree, split almost evenly between the two types.
Recalling that table 2 showed that type 1 individuals are the least productive
in all sectors in terms of having lower wage offers, our results imply that
people who are certified to teach are generally drawn from the higher
productivity types among college graduates.
D. Policy Simulations
In all simulations we assume that the market for teachers is competi-
tive and that all teachers teach if they want to at equilibriumwages. Table 4
simulates the effect of a variety of policy interventions that have the
Table 2
Model Fit to Sample Statistics Based on One-Step-Ahead
Simulations
Actual Model
Proportion with education degree:
Female .178 .177
Male .061 .062
Proportion of teachers employed in:
Municipal schools:
Female .338 .348
Male .296 .318
Voucher schools:
Female .483 .506
Male .482 .512
Unsubsidized schools:
Female .118 .124
Male .140 .150
Nonteaching jobs:
Female .022 .014
Male .041 .013
Proportion of nonteachers employed:
Female .757 .785
Male .852 .885
Mean accepted wages ðin 1,000 pesosÞ:
Teachers in municipal schools:
Female 4,989 4,858
Male 5,352 4,652
Teachers in voucher schools:
Female 5,586 6,459
Male 6,320 7,715
Teachers in unsubsidized schools:
Female 6,412 5,287
Male 7,208 6,108
Nonteachers:
Female 5,809 5,211
Male 8,264 7,681
Teacher Quality under a Voucher System 347
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.010 on December 01, 2016 07:13:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
potential to attract higher-productivity types into teaching and into the
municipal sector.47 These include ðaÞ a bonus to getting an education degree
in the amount of 2 years of municipal wages, ðbÞ a 20% increase in the mu-
nicipal sector teacher wage offer, and ðcÞ the municipal sector adopting the
samewage schedule as the private voucher sector.48We also consider amore
radical type of policy that eliminates the voucher school option for teachers
to see if the availability of the voucher schools lowers the quality of teachers
in the municipal sector.
For each of the policy simulations, we start with the initial conditions
for each person and simulate an entire career path for 100 sets of simu-
lation draws.49 That is, we simulate the decisions individuals make about
whether to obtain an education degree and whether and where to work.
Table 4 reports the averages across the simulations for what the popula-
tion would look like in 2004–7.50
The columns under “Baseline” show the type distributions based on the
model estimates. As seen, in the baseline, 12.1% of college graduates re-
ceive an education degree; 15% of them are type 1s, 18.0% are type 2s,
and 66.7% are type 3s. Of those receiving education degrees, almost all
ð98.6%Þ who work in municipal schools or in unsubsidized schools are
type 3, while there is close to an even split of those who work in voucher
schools among type 2s ð57.2%Þ and type 3s ð42.7%Þ. In fact, type 2s, the
most productive teachers, are found only in the voucher schools.
The first policy simulation evaluates the effect of giving a bonus for ob-
taining an education degree in the amount of 2 years of municipal entry-
level wages. As seen in the first row of table 1, the bonus would increase
47 We are not considering in these simulations equilibrium effects and school
budget constraints.
48 Chile recently introduced a policy that provides fellowships to individuals
who graduate with an education degree.
49 Our simulated policy effects use the EPS distribution of initial conditions
ðgender, age at graduation, and number of childrenÞ rather than the ELD, because
the EPS sample is nationally representative and includes both teachers and non-
teachers.
50 These years correspond to those in which the EPS data were collected.
Table 3
Distribution of Types by Gender and Degrees
Females Males
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Population proportion .730 .018 .253 .721 .059 .221
Proportion given an education degree .184 .090 .726 .060 .450 .490
Proportion given a noneducation
degree .847 .002 .151 .764 .033 .203
NOTE.—The three types refer to the three unobserved heterogeneity types included in estimating the
model.
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the percentage of women obtaining an education degree from 17.7% to
18.7% and the proportion of men from 6.2% to 6.7%. However, it would
also lead to an increase in the percentage of low-productivity ðtype 1Þ
individuals among those earning an education degree, from18.4% to 19.3%
for women and from 6.0% to 6.7% for men, and a reduction in the per-
centage of the highest productivity type ðtype 2Þ.
The second policy intervention we consider is a 20% increase in the
municipal wage. The simulation shows that the wage increase leads to an
increase in the percentages of individuals obtaining an education degree
from 12.1% to 13.6% and, as with the first policy, to an increase in the
share of type 1s among teachers ðfrom 15.3% to 17.9%Þ. Moreover, many
of the type 1 new entrants choose municipal sector employment, increas-
ing their share from only 1.4% to 21.5% of municipal sector teachers.51
Thus, average teacher quality in the municipal sector falls. This policy
also induces type 3s working in the voucher schools to move to the mu-
nicipal schools, so that type 2s are essentially the only teachers in the
voucher schools.
In our next policy simulation, municipal schools adopt a wage offer
function identical to that used in the private voucher schools. Similar in
magnitude to the case of the 20% increase in the municipal wage, 13.7% of
college graduates choose an education degree. However, unlike that pre-
vious policy, this policy induces the highest productivity types to enter the
teaching profession. Specifically, the fraction of those with an education
degree who are type 2s increases from the baseline case of 18.0% to 27.3%.
Moreover, not only are the new entrant type 2s drawn to the municipal
sector, but so are those who were working in the voucher schools. Indeed,
almost all of the type 2s are nowworking in the municipal sector, account-
ing for over one-half ð53.0%Þ of municipal sector teachers.52
The last policy simulation considers the impact of eliminating the
voucher school sector as an employment option for teachers. This change
would lower the percentage of college graduates receiving an education
degree from 12.1% to 10.4 %, with the fall being especially large for men
ðfrom 6.2% to 3.8%Þ. With the absence of voucher schools, all of the type
2s ðall of whom were in voucher schools in the baselineÞ move to the
51 They also choose to work in the small unsubsidized sector.
52 Because the model is partial equilibrium in nature, the counterfactual results
implicitly assume that labor demand in all sectors is infinitely elastic at equilibrium
wages. Also, if teachers care about the identity of students, then some of the coun-
terfactual experimental resultsmaybeaffected.For example,wefind that an increase
in the municipal wage increases the relative supply of less productive individuals to
the municipal sector. If high-ability students are more likely to move to private
schools as a result, and if high-ability teachers prefer high-ability students, then
some high-ability teachers would move to private schools, and the quality of teachers
in municipal schools would be lower than our simulation predicts.
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municipal schools, with type 2s now comprising 11.7% of the munici-
pal school teachers ð7.8% of female teachers and 31.2% of male teachersÞ.
However, the type distribution for those with an education degree would
also change, with the share of type 2s dropping by two-thirds ðfrom 18.0%
to 6.5%Þ.
VII. Conclusions
Chile’s long-term experience with school vouchers on a nationwide
scale provides a unique opportunity to learn how teacher labor markets
operate under a voucher system. In Chile, the market for private educa-
tion is competitive, and more than half of children attend private schools.
Proponents of school voucher systems cite their value in fostering com-
petition and improving the overall quality of public and private schools.
Critics often emphasize that voucher systems draw the best teachers out
of the public school system and into the private system.
In this paper, we developed and estimate a discrete choice dynamic pro-
gramming ðDCDPÞ model of occupational choices, and we use it to eval-
uate a range of potential policies for improving the quality of teachers. The
model builds on earlier related models of Stinebrickner ð2001a, 2001bÞ, ex-
tending his framework to allow for three teaching sectors ðpublic, private
voucher, private nonvoucherÞ, as well as a nonteaching sector and a home
sector, and to incorporate the initial choice about whether to become a
certified teacher.
The estimated model parameters show that unobservable heterogeneity,
incorporated in the model through three discrete types, is an important
feature of the data.53 We found evidence of absolute advantage, namely,
that the types are ranked in the sameway in terms of productivity across all
sectors, with type 1 having the lowest productivity and type 2 the highest.
Simulations based on the estimated model yield a number of interesting
findings. First, among college graduates in Chile, people who enter the
teaching profession are drawn from the higher-productivity types ðtypes 2
and 3Þ. Second, private voucher schools attract higher-quality teachers than
do municipal schools. Third, if the municipal sector were to adopt the
voucher sector wage schedule that tailors pay to type of teacher, the quality
of municipal school teachers would increase.
Fourth, it is difficult to increase the quality of teachers in the municipal
sector simply by increasing teacher pay there. Increasingmunicipal teacher
wages by 20% does not increase quality because low-productivity types
are also drawn into that sector. It is possible that increasing pay to induce
more entry combinedwithminimum standards could increase teacher qual-
ity, but imposing a minimum standard is outside the scope of our model.
53 See Keane and Wolpin ð1997Þ for another example of an occupational choice
model where unobservable heterogeneity plays an important role.
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Fifth, giving a bonus for getting an education degree induces more people
to major in education but does not substantially affect the quality.
Sixth, we performed a simulation that examines how the composition of
teachers would change if the private voucher school sector were elimi-
nated as an employment option. We find that not having a private voucher
sector would increase the quality of teachers in municipal schools. How-
ever, this benefit comes at a cost of lowering the overall quality of teachers.
The existence of a private voucher sector, where teacher wages are com-
petitively determined, attracts higher productivity individuals into the teach-
ing profession.54
Considering the common criticisms of voucher systems, we find sup-
port for the concern that private voucher schools are able to attract bet-
ter teachers than municipal schools, largely because they pay higher-
productivity teachers more. But the pool of teachers is not fixed, and the
existence of the private voucher sector draws higher-productivity indi-
viduals into the teaching sector and improves the overall pool of people
choosing teaching as a profession.
Appendix A
Estimation of the Weighting Matrix and of the Limiting Distribution
As noted in the text, for a general weighting matrix W, the method of
moments estimator is distributed asﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
ðg^2 gÞ ∼ ðNð0; ðGWG0Þ21ðG0WVWGÞððG0WG0Þ21Þ0Þ:
For ease of exposition, in describing the construction of the variance-
covariance matrix of the moments, V, consider a vector of a set of two
moments corresponding to outcomes y1ia and y
2
ia. The second moment uses
observations for whichDi;Z0
ia
; ~A
0 5 1, which may overlap with the set of ob-
servations for which Di;Zia; ~A 5 1.
fNðgÞ5
1
N o
N
i51
o
a0
a5a0
ðy1ia 2 y^1iaðgÞÞDi;Zia; ~Awi
1
N o
N
i51
o
a0
a5a0
ðy2ia 2 y^2iaðgÞÞDi;Z0
ia
; ~A
0wi
266664
377775:
54 We do not allow for teacher effort because we do not have the necessary data.
Were the data available, allowing for teacher effort would be an interesting
extension. Given this nontrivial change to the model, however, we cannot spec-
ulate with confidence about how that extension would affect the counterfactual
results.
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To simplify the notation, we suppress the dependence of y^ on g. A con-
sistent estimator of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the param-
eter estimates substitutes V^N and G^N, where the estimator for V is
V^N 5
 1
N
2  oNI
i51
o
a0
a5a0
o
a0
l5a0
ðy1ia 2 y^1iaÞðy1il 2 y^1ilÞDi;Zia; ~ADi;Zil ; ~Aw2i ðy1ia 2 y^1iaÞðy2il 2 y^2ilÞDi;Zia; ~ADi;Z 0il ; ~A0w
2
i
ðy2ia 2 y^2iaÞðy1il 2 y^1ilÞDi;Zia; ~ADi;Z 0
il
; ~A
0w2i ðy2ia 2 y^2iaÞðy2il 2 y^2ilÞDi;Z 0
ia
; ~A
0Di;Z 0
il
; ~A
0w2i
" #
:
The off diagonal terms for any two moments that are based on different
individuals ðor different data setsÞ will be zero ði.e., zero covarianceÞ. For
moments based in part on the same individuals, there are variance terms and
covariance terms ðcapturing the correlations across agesÞ.
The matrix G is the matrix of derivatives of each of the moments with
respect to the model parameters. Let K denote the number of parameters
ðdimension of gÞ The dimensionality of G is K  m. For example, for two
moments, the G
0
matrix is
G
0
5
yf 1NðgÞ
yg0
yf 2NðgÞ
yg0
2664
3775
2K
:
The derivatives that make up the elements of the Gmatrix are estimated by
numerical derivatives. Let gi denote the ith element of g and let Di denote
the same size vector Di that is zero everywhere except in the ith element,
which is a small positive number. Then the derivative of moment m with
respect to gi is estimated by
y f mN ðgÞb
ygi
5
f mN ðg1 DiÞ2 f mN ðgÞ
Di
:
The weighting matrixW is a diagonal matrix that does not depend on the
parameter values. The diagonal elements are chosen to make the magnitude
of the differentmoments roughly comparable. Specifically, we compute the
mean of the outcome to which each moment refers and use one over
the mean as the weight. For example, for wages in a given sector, we com-
pute the average wage in that sector ðfor people who actually work in that
sectorÞ and the weight is one over the mean. A similar weight is used for
the moments representing proportions.
Appendix B
Moments Used in Estimation
To use separate simulation algorithms and separate state spaces, we
separate the EPS data set into certified teachers ðEPStÞ and nonteachers
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ðEPSntÞ. EPSnt has a sample size of 697 and a total number of person-year
observations of 6,841.
B1. Moments Using Data from Age aG+1 to Age aR
Moments from the age of graduation/certification ðaG 1 1Þ to the age of
retirement ðaRÞ refer to outcomes and choices subsequent to the decision
on whether to get a teaching degree. The options for certified and non-
certified teachers are different ðnoncertified teachers cannot teachÞ; hence
the algorithm that simulates one-step ahead forecasts is different for cer-
tified teachers and nonteachers. Moreover, simulations are conditional on
the state space, which is different for different individuals.
Because of the different problems that certified teachers and nonteach-
ers solve, we match different moments to the different data sets: ELD,
EPSt, and EPSnt. In all three data sets, we only use cells that contain at least
20 observations. A cell is defined by the value of the variables on which
the moment is conditioned, so, for instance, the size of the cell “outcome1
by gender5 female” is the number ofwomen forwhomwe have both a real
outcome and a simulated outcome. A simulated outcome exists if and
only if all the variables in the current state space are nonmissing.
We grouped together cells for which there were too few observations in
a way that maintained variation, so, for example, if there were three age
categories, we would not group together all three age categories because
by doing so we would lose the age variation.
Moments Based on the ELD Data Set
We match 229 moments to the ELD. We do not use the year after they
initially become certified to teach ðwhich is why age starts at 23 and not at
22Þ. The following are the categories used in constructing the moments
based on the ELD data:
• agecat1 separates age into the following three categories: ½23, 34,
½35, 44, ½45, 54.
• agecat1males separates the age of males into the following categories,
and it is used only for the fertility moments: ½23, 44, ½45, 54.
• agecat2 separates age into the following four categories: ½23, 29,
½30, 34, ½35, 44, ½45, 54.
• texpcat separates teaching experience into the following categories:
½0, 4, ½5, 9, ½10, 14, ½15, 19.
• nkidscat is equal to the number of children if this is equal 0, 1, or 2. If
the number of children is 3 or above, then nkidscat53. ðIn the data,
there are at most four children per individualÞ.
The sectors for which we have wages in the ELD data are municipal
school, private-unsubsidized school, and private-subsidized school. No
wages are available for the nonteaching sector.
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We match squared wages because we truncated outliers in the wage
distribution. Matching wage variances would be infeasible because it
would introduce a dependence across individuals that would make the
estimation of the variance/covariance matrix of the moments too costly
computationally.
List of moments:
ðiÞ wage and wage squared by sector, agecat1, gender
ðiiÞ wage and wage squared by sector, texpcat and gender
ðiiiÞ wage and wage squared by sector, nkidscat and gender
ðivÞ fractions in sectors M, V, U by texpcat and gender55
ðvÞ fractions in sectors M, V, U by nkidscat and gender
ðviÞ fractions in sectors M, V, U by agecat2 and gender
ðviiÞ fraction of individuals working in a teaching occupation who are
laid off by texpcat
ðviiiÞ fraction of femaleswho have a child by agecat1, nkidscat, whether
they had a child in the previous period ðup to age 44Þ
ðixÞ fraction of males who have a child by agecat1males, nkidscat,
whether they had a child in the previous period ðup to age 49Þ
ðxÞ transition probabilities from sectors M V U to sectors M V U by
gender ðwe do not match transitions from and to sectors NT and
H because there are too few observationsÞ
Moments Using the EPSnt ðEPS-NonteacherÞ Data Set
We match 106 moments to the EPSnt. The following are the EPSnt cat-
egories used in constructing the moments:
• agecat1 separates age into the following three categories: ½22, 34,
½35, 44, ½45, 54.
• agecat2 separates age into the following four categories: ½22, 29,
½30, 34, ½35, 44, ½45, 54.
• ntexpcat separates nonteaching experience into the following cate-
gories: ½0, 4, ½5, 9, ½10, 14, ½15, 19.
• nkidscat is equal to the number of children if this is equal 0, 1, or 2. If
the number of children is three or above, then nkidscat53. ðIn the
data, there are at most five children per individualÞ.
Wages are available only for the nonteaching occupation, as the indi-
viduals in EPSnt are not certified to teach. The following is a list of EPSnt
moments used in estimation:
55 We do not match fractions in NT and H because there are too few obser-
vations.
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ðiÞ wage and wage squared by agecat1 and gender
ðiiÞ wage and wage squared by ntexpcat and gender
ðiiiÞ wage and wage squared by nkidscat and gender
ðivÞ fraction in sector NT by ntexpcat and gender
ðvÞ fraction in sector NT by nkidscat and gender
ðviÞ fraction in sector NT by agecat2 and gender
ðviiÞ fraction of individuals working in a nonteaching occupation laid
off by ntexpcat
ðviiiÞ fraction of individuals who have a child by gender, agecat2,
nkidscat and whether they had a child the previous period ðup to
age 44 for female and 49 for malesÞ
ðixÞ persistence in sectors NT and H by gender56
Moments Using Data from aG
In the first period of the model, at the age of graduation/certification
ðaGÞ, individuals choose between a teaching certification and getting a non-
teaching college degree.Wematch twomoments:
ðxÞ the fraction of males who get certified
ðxiÞ the fraction of females who get certified
using the EPS data.57
B2. Structure of the Variance Covariance
Matrix of the Moment Conditions
The variance covariance matrixV, used in the computation of the param-
eter standard errors, is a square symmetric matrix with a number of rows
equal to the total number of moments matched, 337. Because the individ-
uals in ELD and EPS are different, there is no covariance between the mo-
ments pertaining to individuals from different data sets. HenceV is a block
diagonalmatrixwith twoblockmatriceson thediagonal: onecorresponding
to the EPS moments ðVEPSÞ and one corresponding to the ELD moments
ðVELDÞ.
The matrix VEPS, occupying rows and columns 1–108 of V, contains the
variance of the moments related to the choices of nonteachers ðEPSntÞ
from time period 1 onward, the variance of the moments relative to the
choice of certification at time 0, and their covariances. Rows and columns
56 We match only persistence because transition to the other sector is defined
residually.
57 The fraction getting certified is not observed in the ELD data set, which only
contains information on teachers.
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109–337 contain VELD, the matrix of the moments relative to the choices of
teachers ðELDÞ from time period 1 onward.
References
Auguste, Sebastian, and Juan Pablo Valenzuela. 2003. Do students benefit
from school competition? Evidence from Chile. Unpublished manu-
script, University of Michigan.
Bacolod, Marigee. 2007. Who teaches and where they choose to teach:
College graduates of the 1990s. Educational Evaluation and Policy Anal-
ysis 29, no. 3:155–68.
Ballou, Dale, and Michael Podgursky. 1995. Recruiting smarter teachers.
Journal of Human Resources 30, no. 2:326–38.
———. 1997. Teacher pay and teacher quality. Kalamazoo, MI: WE
Upjohn Institute.
Ben-Porath, Yoram. 1967. The production of human capital and the life
cycle of earnings. Journal of Political Economy 75, no. 4:352–65.
Bohlmark, Anders, and Mikael Lindahl. 2008. Does school privatization
improve educational achievement? Evidence from Sweden’s voucher re-
form. IZAWorking Paper 3691, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn.
Bravo, David, Dante Contreras, and Claudia Sanhueza. 1999. Rendi-
miento escolar, desigualdad, y brecha de desempen˜o privado/pu´blico:
Chile, 1982–1997 ðSchool performance inequality and the gap in private/
public performance: Chile, 1982–1997Þ. Working paper no. 163, Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Chile.
Bravo, David, Ba´rbara Flores, and Patricia Medrano. Se premia la habili-
dad en el mercado laboral docente? Cua´nto impacta en el desempen˜o de
los estudiantes? ðRewarding ability in the teacher labor market: What are
the impacts on student performance?Þ Working paper, Department of
Economics, University of Chile.
Brewer, Dominic J. 1996. Career paths and quit decisions: Evidence from
teaching. Journal of Labor Economics 14, no. 2:313–39.
Carnoy, Martin. 1997. Is privatization through education vouchers really
the answer? A comment on West. World Bank Research Observer 12,
no. 1:105–16.
Card, David,MartinDooley, andAbigail Payne. 2008. School competition
and efficiency with publicly funded Catholic schools. NBER Working
Paper no. 14176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
MA.
Chan, Ping Ching Winnie. 2009. School choice, competition, and public
school performance. PhD diss., University of Toronto.
Chen,Dandan. 2009. The economics of teacher supply in Indonesia.World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series no. 4975, World Bank,
Washington, DC.
Teacher Quality under a Voucher System 357
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.010 on December 01, 2016 07:13:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Clotfelter,Charles,ElizabethGlennie,HelenLadd, andJacobVigdor. 2008.
Would higher salaries keep teachers in high-poverty schools? Evidence
from a policy intervention inNorth Carolina. Journal of Public Economics
92, nos. 5–6:1352–70.
Contreras, Dante. 2002. Vouchers, school choice, and access to higher
education. Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper no. 845, Yale
University.
Corcoran, Sean P.,WilliamN. Evans, and Robert S. Schwab. 2004. Chang-
ing labor market opportunities for women and the quality of teachers,
1957–1992. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 94,
no. 2:230–35.
Correa, Juan A., Francisco Parro, and Loreto Reyes. 2015. Self-selection
in the market of teachers. Applied Economics 47, no. 13:1331–49.
Dolton, Peter J. 1990. The economics of UK teacher supply: The gradu-
ate’s decision. Economic Journal 100, no. 400:91–104.
Dolton, Peter J., and Kostas G. Mavromaras. 1994. Intergenerational
occupational choice comparisons: The case of teachers in the UK. Eco-
nomic Journal 104, no. 425:841–63.
Dolton, Peter J., and Wilbert van der Klaauw. 1995. Leaving teaching in
the UK: A duration analysis. Economic Journal 105, no. 429:431–44.
———. 1999. The turnover of teachers: A competing risks explanation.
Review of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 3:543–52.
Elacqua, Gregory. 2006. Public, Catholic, and for-profit school enroll-
ment practices in response to vouchers: Evidence fromChile. Paper 124,
National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education, Teachers
College, Columbia University.
Falch, Torberg. 2010. The elasticity of labor supply at the establishment
level. Journal of Labor Economics 28, no. 2:237–66.
———. 2011. Teacher mobility responses to wage changes: Evidence from
a quasi-natural experiment. American Economic Review 101, no. 3:460–
65.
Ferreyra, Maria. 2007. Estimating the effects of private school vouchers in
multi-district economies.American Economic Review 97, no. 3:787–817.
Figlio, David N. 2002. Can public schools buy better-qualified teachers?
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55, no. 4:686–99.
Figlio, David, and Cassandra M. D. Hart. 2014. Competitive effects of
means-tested school vouchers. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 6, no. 1:133–56.
Gallego, Francisco A. 2002. Competencia y resultados educativos: Teoria
y evidencia para Chile ðCompetition and educational results: Theory
and evidence for ChileÞ. Cuardenos de economı´a 39, no. 118:309–52.
Gibbons, Stephen, Olmo Silva, and Stephen Machin. 2008. Choice, com-
petition, and pupil achievement. Journal of the European Economic
Association 6, no. 4:912–47.
358 Behrman et al.
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.010 on December 01, 2016 07:13:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Gourierioux, Christian, and Alain Monfort. 2002. Simulation-based econo-
metric methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greenbaum, Robert T. 2002. A spatial study of teachers’ salaries in Penn-
sylvania school districts. Journal of Labor Research 23, no. 1:69–86.
Guarino, Cassandra M., Abigail B. Brown, and Adam E. Wyse. 2011.
Can districts keep good teachers in the schools that need them most?
Economics of Education Review 30, no. 5:962–79.
Hanushek, Eric A., John F. Kain, and Steven G. Rivkin. 1999. Do higher
salaries buy better teachers? NBER Working Paper no. 7082, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. http://www.nber.org
/papers/w7082.
Hanushek, Eric A., and Steven G. Rivkin. 2006. Teacher quality. InHand-
book of the economics of education, ed. Eric Hanushek and FinnisWelch,
1051–78. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Heckman, James J., and Guilherme Sedlacek. 1985. Heterogeneity, aggre-
gation, and market wage functions: An empirical model of self-selection
in the labor market. Journal of Political Economy 93, no. 6:1077–1125.
Heckman, James, and Burton Singer. 1984. A method for minimizing the
impact of distributional assumptions in econometricmodels for duration
data. Econometrica 52, no. 2:271–320.
Hernani-Limarino, Werner. 2005. Are teachers well paid in Latin America
and the Caribbean? Relative wage and structure of returns of teachers.
In Incentives to improve teaching: Lessons from Latin America, ed. Emi-
liana Vegas, 63–102. Washington, DC:World Bank.
Hoxby, Caroline. 2002. Would school choice change the teaching pro-
fession? Journal of Human Resources 37, no. 4:846–91.
———. 2003a. Could school choice be a tide that lifts all boats? In The
economics of school choice, edited by Caroline M. Hoxby, 287–342. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2003b. Introduction. In The economics of school choice, ed.
Caroline M. Hoxby, 1–22. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Miguel Urquiola. 2003. When schools compete,
how do they compete? An assessment of Chile’s nationwide school
voucher program. NBERWorking Paper no. 10008, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
———. 2006. The effects of generalized school choice on achievement and
stratification: Evidence fromChile’s voucher program. Journal of Public
Economics 90, nos. 8–9:1477–1503.
Imazeki, Jennifer. 2005. Teacher salaries and teacher attrition. Economics
of Education Review 24, no. 4:431–49.
Ingersoll, Richard M. 2003. The teacher shortage: Myth or reality? Edu-
cational Horizons 81, no. 3:146–52.
Keane, Michael P., and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 1997. The career decisions of
young men. Journal of Political Economy 105, no. 3:473–522.
Teacher Quality under a Voucher System 359
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.010 on December 01, 2016 07:13:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Keane, Michael P., Petra E. Todd, and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 2010. The
structural estimation of behavioral models: Discrete choice dynamic pro-
gramming methods and applications. In Handbook of labor economics,
vol. 2, ed. David Card and Orley Ashenfelter, 332–461. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Krueger, Alan, and Pei Zhu. 2004. Another look at the New York City
school voucher experiment.American Behavioral Scientist 47, no. 5:658–
98.
Ladd, Helen. 2002. School vouchers: A critical view. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 16, no. 4:3–24.
Manski, Charles F. 1987. Academic ability, earnings, and decision to be-
come a teacher: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Study of the
High School Class of 1972. In Public sector payrolls, ed. David A. Wise,
291–316. Chicago: University of Chicago.
McEwan, Patrick J. 2001. The effectiveness of public, Catholic, and non-
religious private schools in Chile’s voucher system. Education Econom-
ics 9, no. 2:103–28.
McEwan, Patrick J., and Martin Carnoy. 2001. The effectiveness and
efficacy of private schools in Chile’s voucher system. Educational Eval-
uation and Policy Analysis 22, no. 3:213–39.
Mizala, Alejandra, and Pilar Romaguera. 2005. Teachers’ salary structure and
incentives in Chile. In Incentives to improve teaching: Lessons from Latin
America, ed. Emiliana Vegas, 103–50. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mont, Daniel, and Daniel I. Rees. 1996. The influence of classroom char-
acteristics on high school teacher turnover. Economic Inquiry 34, no. 1:
152–67.
Murnane, Richard J., and Randall J. Olsen. 1989. The effects of salaries and
opportunity costs on duration in teaching: Evidence from Michigan.
Review of Economics and Statistics 71, no. 2:347–52.
———. 1990. The effects of salaries and opportunity costs on length of
stay in teaching: Evidence from North Carolina. Journal of Human Re-
sources 25, no. 1:106–24.
Neal, Derek. 2002. How vouchers would change the market for educa-
tion. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 4:25–44.
Newey, Whitney, and Daniel McFadden. 1994. Large sample estimation
and hypothesis testing. InHandbook of econometrics, vol. 4, ed. Robert
F. Engle and Daniel L. McFadden, 2111–2245. Amstersdam: Elsevier.
Ondrich, Jan, Emily Pas, and John Yinger. 2008. The determinants of
teacher attrition in upstate New York. Public Finance Review 36, no. 1:
112–44.
Podgursky, Michael, Ryan Monroe, and Donald Watson. 2004. The aca-
demic quality of public school teachers: An analysis of entry and exit
behavior. Economics of Education Review 23, no. 5:507–18.
Rees, Daniel I. 1991. Grievance procedure strength and teacher quits.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45, no. 1:31–43.
360 Behrman et al.
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.010 on December 01, 2016 07:13:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Richards, Craig E., and Tian Ming Sheu. 1992. The South Carolina School
Incentive Reward Program: A policy analysis. Economics of Education
Review 11, no. 1:71–86.
Rivkin, Steven G., Eric A. Hanushek, and John F. Kain. 2005. Teachers,
schools, and academic achievement. Econometrica 73, no. 2:417–58.
Rouse, Cecilia. 1998. Private school vouchers and student achievement:
The effect of theMilwaukee parental choice program.Quarterly Journal
of Economics 113, no. 2:553–602.
Roy, Andrew D. 1951. Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings.
Oxford Economic Papers 3, no. 2:135–46.
Sandstrom, F. Mikael, and Fredrik Bergstro¨m. 2005. School vouchers in
practice: Competition will not hurt you. Journal of Public Economics 89,
nos. 2–3:351–80.
Sapelli, Claudio, and Bernardita Vial. 2002. The performance of private and
public schools in the Chilean voucher system.Cuaderos de economia 39,
no. 118:423–54.
Scafidi, Benjamin, David L. Sjoquist, and Todd R. Stinebrickner. 2006. Do
teachers really leave for higher paying jobs in alternative occupations?
B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Advances in Economic
Analysis and Policy 6, no. 1:1–42.
Shin, Jaeun, and Sangho Moon. 2006. Fertility, relative wages, and labor
market decisions: A case of female teachers. Economics of Education
Review 25, no. 6:591–604.
Stinebrickner, Todd R. 1998. An empirical investigation of teacher attri-
tion. Economics of Education Review 17, no. 2:127–36.
———. 2001a. Compensation policies and teacher decisions. Interna-
tional Economic Review, 42, no. 3:751–80.
———. 2001b. A dynamic model of teacher labor supply. Journal of
Labor Economics 19, no. 1:196–230.
Theobald, Neil D. 1990. An examination of the influence of personal,
professional, and school district characteristics on public school teacher
retention. Economics of Education Review 9, no. 3:241–50.
Theobald, Neil D., and R. Mark Gritz. 1996. The effects of school district
spending priorities on the exit paths of beginning teachers leaving the
district. Economics of Education Review 15, no. 1:11–22.
Tincani, Michela Maria. 2014. School vouchers and the joint sorting of stu-
dents and teachers. Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Global
WorkingGroup,Working Paper no. 2014-012, Economics ResearchCen-
ter, University of Chicago.
Tokman, Andrea Ramos. 2002. Is private education better? Evidence from
Chile. Working Paper of Central Bank of Chile 147. Central Bank of
Chile.
Vegas, Emiliana. 2002. School choice, student performance, and teacher
and school characteristics: The Chilean case.World Bank Report,World
Bank, Washington, DC.
Teacher Quality under a Voucher System 361
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.010 on December 01, 2016 07:13:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Verhoogen, Eric, and Miguel Urquiola 2009. Class-size caps, sorting,
and the regression-discontinuity design. American Economic Review 99,
no. 1:179–215.
West, Martin, and Ludger Woessman. 2010. Every Catholic child in a
Catholic school? Historical resistance to state schooling, contemporary
private competition and student achievement across countries.Economic
Journal 12, no. 546:229–55.
Wiswall, Matthew. 2007. Licensing and occupational sorting in the market
for teachers. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, New
York University.
Wolter, Stefan C., and Stefan Denzler. 2004. Wage elasticity of the teacher
supply in Switzerland. Brussels Economic Review 47, nos. 3–4:387–407.
Yau, Jeffrey. 2004. Estimating the impact of vouchers when the impact
depends on the duration of program participation. PhD diss., University
of Pennsylvania.
362 Behrman et al.
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.010 on December 01, 2016 07:13:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
